The text does not anticipate the procurement of a UK carrier group. Rather, it supplies a framework for considering the potential interception by Russian signals intelligence of maritime communications traffic carried by a UK carrier group during future operations, and the implications of such interception for UK national security. In this respect, a carrier group deployment anywhere in the world generates communications activity throughout the NATO maritime area, with additional movement, engagement, or activity in the Arctic, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, or the South China Sea. The potential therefore exists for a combination of Russia’s own signals intelligence collection capabilities and that of the GRU’s 16th Main Centre for Special Technologies to be undertaken on a predictive and monitoring basis. Should a carrier group be operating at the outer reaches of UK national security while engaged in operations at any location of interest to Russia, a heightened risk to operations exists as a result of the possibility of Russian monitoring, both in terms of channelling and content.
The director of signals intelligence for the United Kingdom and its overseas territories, NSA, and Central Security Service, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) occupies a paradoxical position with respect to UK carrier strike group operations. The principle of freedom of navigation under international law permits vessels belonging to all states to navigate the territorial sea of another state so long as that navigation is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state. While the activities of a UK carrier group may therefore be formed without restriction, the signals generated during operations represent a considerable source of UNCLASSIFIED–C0NTAINS TURKEY, NORWAY, AND U.S. OFFICIALS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED MATERIAL 20 traffic for Russia to exploit. Signals intelligence collection and associated information warfare operations have a central role in Russia’s national military strategy, especially for the naval services, and demands as a consequence that risk to UK and Allied force operations and associated effectiveness is at the forefront of GCHQ and UK senior leadership for any operations conducted to or within Russia’s areas of interest.
