In the middle of the Atlantic, a fishing boat that sails slowly does not need to attract attention. After all, we are talking about boats that spend a good part of their time away from shore, doing things that we can’t always detect from the outside. However, beneath the same waters runs an infrastructure upon which communication between countries and continents depends. And when certain movements begin to repeat themselves around their routes, the question may arise of what seems like a simple maritime activity that goes beyond fishing.
An investigation set off alarm bells. British newspaper The Telegraph has identified 17 Russian fishing vessels whose movements have raised doubts about their true activity in the Atlantic. The analysis, based on four-and-a-half years of navigation records, documented more than 500 episodes in which these vessels were close to submarine cables or followed their path. These are the communication links that connect the UK with other European countries and with the US Of concern is that some of these routes may respond to reclamation operations, not just fishing operations.
Movement left a trace. To reconstruct these episodes, the study’s authors focused on records from the Global Fishing Watch, a platform that collects data on vessel activity at sea. Part of this monitoring is supported by AIS, a system through which ships transmit data such as their position, course and speed, which can also be captured by satellites. By comparing these trajectories with nautical charts that indicate cable routes, the analysis made it possible to identify low-speed movements, long-lasting positions and routes that corresponded to the layouts of these infrastructures.
Cables have their own names. The fishing vessels followed nine different cable routes, including one Atlantic Crossing 1 and the now-retired TAT-14. Another was near the Hibernia Express, which crossed the Atlantic, before following the route of Shefa-2, between Shetland and the Faroe Islands. A third boat traveled partially along the Amitié and Grace Hopper routes. Investigations include reducing speed to two or three knots. These are specific examples of behavior that has attracted attention, beyond the simple presence of these vessels in the area.
Suspicion grows. The observed paths raise a question: What information can a ship near an undersea cable receive? Although their general routes appear on nautical charts, more detailed information is needed to locate these structures more precisely. A naval official quoted by The Telegraph explained that ships of this size could carry remotely operated underwater sonar-equipped vehicles, capable of probing the seabed. There is no public evidence that these fishing vessels used these devices, but it helps to understand why their tactics are a concern.
The Internet also crosses the Atlantic. Underwater cables aren’t just used to connect countries: messages, video calls, financial transactions and a good portion of the traffic that powers digital services are carried over their optical fibers. According to the British government, the network carries about 99% of the country’s international telecommunications and data traffic, a reliance that helps understand its security concerns. If one of these links is damaged, traffic can be diverted to other links, but the simultaneous interruption of several critical cables can affect essential services and economic activities.

Doubts were already there. In a separate case, in May 2025, the European Union sanctioned two Russian fishing companies, Norebo JSC and Moorman Seafood, for activities that the EU Council said threatened critical infrastructure. In the Norebo case, the agency linked unusual sailing patterns to Russian state-backed surveillance operations that used civilian vessels for spying missions in the North Sea and Baltic region. As for Moorman Seafood, it noted that one of its vessels carried out atypical maneuvers near underwater cables and strategic Norwegian facilities.
Surveillance is also military. In April 2026, the UK revealed an operation lasting more than a month to track a Russian attack submarine and two others from GUGI, an agency specializing in deep-sea operations. A British frigate and aircraft, along with Norwegian and other Allied assets, took part in monitoring the North Atlantic. The Commons Defense Commission warned of a significant anti-submarine shortfall on 22 October: the Royal Navy has five frigates with towed sonar, eight deemed necessary to detect and track enemy submarines.
Featured Image | Hebrew (CC BY-SA 3.0)
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